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The passage off the Interstate Commerce Act by the
United States Congress duritg the year 187 naturally leads
theoies for a century or

one to believe tuat the chant e in
more,

unquestioned,

regarding the relationls existing between

State and citizen &
in

being made simultaneously

,rith changes

the passage of this act,

has asserted

industrial methods.
Coingress,

authority

in

over man acting in

his private capacity,

sweeping manner never before heard of.
and I think I am safe in

saying,

and in a

It is most improbable,

that no simrilar act will be

passed relating to other indu.stries,

when we consider and

study the nature and effect of the Act in question.
As is well known, railroading is a quasi-public
business, and one to a greater or less degree effecting the
interests of the country at large,

so that Congress may act

in this case in a restrictive manner, which if used toward
most other enterprises, conducted with private capital, would
be highly unconstitutional.

The constitutional right of the

Legislature to pass the Act is given by Sec. 8 of Art. I of
the Constitution of the United States, and by which Congress
is given the power "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes'
The extent of the power which this section intended
to confer may be ascertained by e:amiining the debates

in

the

Constitijtional Convention, as reported in the "Federalist".
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"It

was intended",

said the learned judge in Cook v. State of
in his allusion to the power

Pennsylvania, (97 U. S. 566),

conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce,

"to guard against

any taxation by the States which would interfere
freest

interchange

differeiit

of corimodities

ith the

among the people of the

States."
The 9th Sec.

of Art.

I of the Constituttion foroids

any tax or duty to be laid upon goods passing between the
States.

One State shall have an equal right with another,

and no preference may be shown.
By the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States it is provided that, "No person sball be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law;

nor shall private property be taken for public use

without just compensation."
for Congress,

So it would be clearly unlawful

in the exercise of its power to

try and force

roads to continue business at a loss, or to establish such
low rates as to render profits impossible.

Coming, as we

have, upon the question of rates, a question most
under the Act, I shall spend my time
subject,-

important

in a treatment of this

not the entire subject of rates hoxever,-

that division found in the 4th Sec.

but to

of the Act, and what is

familiarly termed "the long and short haul clause".
The construction of this section is constantly
brought before the Commission and is one necessitating much
care and attention.

This section of the Act, as enacted by

Congress, reads as follows:

"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive
any greater compensation, in the aggregate, for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions,
er than for a longer distance over the same line,

for a shortin the same

direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any
common carrier within the terms of this Act, to charge and
receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer
distance.

Provided, however, that upon applicaticn to the

Commission appointed under the provisions of this Act,

such

common carrier may in special cases, after investigation by
the Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than
for shorter distances, for the transportation of passengers
or property;

and the Commission may from time to time pre-

scribe the extent to which such designated common carriers
may be relieved from the operation of this section of this
Act."
Before this Act came into force, the rates throughout the country were regulated entirely by the proprietors of
the different roads, and, in a way, as best suited their interests and welfare.

During the first year or so after this

enactment by Congress, much was done

in the direction of

bringing railroad rates into conformity with the general rule
of Sec. 4 of the Act.
In July 1888 the Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City

R.

R.

Co.,

a company havirC a line from Chicaro to St.

Paul.

and Minneapolis, announced to the Commission (which is the
bodr a- poirted by the President,

under this Act,

and with the

authority to inquire into the manar-ement of al) common carriers) its purpose to reduce very larn ely its rates between
the termini of its road without reducing intermediate rates;
the effect of which would be to make the rate upon any corsignment to many of the intermediate stations greater than it
would be if carried through to the terminus.
The Company gave two reasons as justifying their
action. First,- That the intermediate rates were just and
reasonable, and therefore there was no injustice in maintaining them. Second,- That the competition between the terminal
points forced them to greatly reduce their rates.
as reduced were below what was reasonable,

The rates

but the action of

the other companies made them all that was possible to obtain
and conditions were established dissimilar to those prevailing at intermediate points, so as to justify the action and
avoid the statute.
The Commission immediately ordered a hearing.

The

reason for the change of rates was shown to be as stated above,
which seemed strong, and was certainly plausible.

But the

question involved was a question of the construction of the
Act.

Its answer was to be arrived at on considerations of

what was probably the legislative intent.

It was seen that

the circumstances and conditions relied upon as entitling the
carrier to make the exceptional rates were not ones growing

out of natural causes; ther were not the outcome of competition by water routes; there was no peculiarity of the line,
which would make rates at the termini, and at other stations,
relatively just; the only dissimilarity in the circumstances
and conditions which attended, was the sharp competition at
the termini, and which did not exist at intermediate points.
But this is a circumstances which is apt to exist
between many of the roads of the United States, and if this
is without the statute, the fourth section would be practically valueless.
quence.

The legislature never intended the conse-

It did not intend, as the Comnission believed, that

the carriers subject to the law should at pleasure make the
rule

of the statute ineffectual.

In the present case the

carrier under investi ,ation conformed to this conclusion,

and

graded Its rates accordingly, and the objectionable rates
made by the carrier complained of were soon discontinued.
Many cases similar to the one above mentioned,

come

constantly before the Commission, and the greatest care must
be exercised to prevent the fourth section from becoming
worthless.
In the Southern and South-western States the Commission found that the roads were slow in corforming to the
new law, but this might be a very natural consecuence, as
water competition in that section of the country was very
brisk, and led to more trouble in establishing the rates.
Water competition is a subject of great interest, and one often arising under the section in question.

The railroads are,

or at least were a few years ago, too much inclined to press
the competition to such a rate that the Commission would look
upon it as unreasonable and compel the railroad to change the
rate.

The carriers by water have as much right to remunera-

tive rates as the carriers by land, and the carrier by rail
does not,

therefore,

make out a complete case when called

upon to justify extraordinary differences between his rate at
a point of water competition and other points, wh&en he shows
that at the former he made very low rates because otherwise
he could not have obtained the business.

Perhaps in the

light of public interest he should not have had it, for undoubtedly the public good is best subserved when all the
carriers which the needs of the country require are suffered
to do business at a reasonable compensation, and where their
rates, as between all their points, are relatively as nearly
equal and just as under the circumstances they can be made.
The facts are sometimes overlooked in the making up of railroad rate sheets when water competition is to be taken into
account and its influence allowed forWe have in the 4th Section of this Act the phrase,"after investirpation by the Commission."

Let vs look briefly

at its meaning as decided by the Commission and the Federal
Courts.
In the case of In re Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (Com. Rep. Vol. I, p
31,)Judge Cooley says, "From the first there have been two
opinions regarding the proper construction of the provision

for exceptions to the 4th Section, one view being that no exOeption can be lawful unless made with the sanction of the
Commission; and the other,- apparently better supported on
the words of the statute,- that an order of relief is not
required when the circumstances and conditions are substantially dissimilar, since the carrier in acting upon them,
would commit no breach of law, though he would be responsible
in case the circumstances were found to be misconceived."
Under this last view an order would be necessary
only in a case where the circumstances were plainly dissimilar.

To be sure, the carrier in acting runs the risk of hav-

ing the Commission decide the circumstances similar, in which
case he must stand the loss.

The Conmission may decide against

the railroad company and issue an order which the company may
refuse to obey.

In this case the Federal Court takes up the

matter, not alone upon the facts of the Cormiission's

report,

but a new trial is ordered, which admits new matter as well
as the evidence in the former trial.

If the court reverse

the decision of the Cormmissicn the railroad company may keep
its chanc-ed rates and is liable for no damages.

The carrier

must be its own judge and judges in peril of the consequences.
We come now to a difficult,
important, question arising under this

and by far the most
section, and that is,-

what constitutes dissimilar circumstances,

and does mere com-

petition create such a state?
We find in

the case of The James & Mayer Buggy Co.

v. The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas R. R. Co.,

(5th Rep.

of Com. p 90) that water competition to Justify the greater
charge for the shorter distance must be competition in transportation to the longer distance point and as to freight,
which, if not carried over the line on which it is located,
would reach slich destination by water transportation.
In t!)e 1892 reports the Commission decided that the
existence of actual competition which is of controlling
force, in respect to traffic important in amount, may make
out the dissimilar circumstances and conditions, entitling
the carrier to charge less for the longer than for the shorter haul over the same line in the same direction, the shorter
being included in the longer distance;
1.

in the following cases.

Competition with carriers by water which are not

subject to provisions of the statute.
2.

Competition with foreign or other railroads which

are not subject to statute.
3.

In rare cases of competition between railroads

which are subject to statute, when strict application of the
general rule of statute would be destructive of legitimate
competition.
Turning our attention to the first of the above
three classes of competition, water competition, we find little disagreement among the decisions.

In the case of the

Board of Trade of Chattanooga v. East Tennessee, Virginia &
Geor;ia R. R. Co.,

found in the 1893 reports, it is held that

where actual water competition rates my be fixed the cornpetition must, however, be of a controlling factor, and the
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mere fact that a point is

situated on a stream is

case of W. 0.

Colutmbus & Western R.

I.

Hartwell v.

the

held in

R.

Co.,

(1

C. Rep. 631) as not sufficient of itself to justify the

lesser charge for a lon :er

raul to such a point; but competi-

tion, as stated above, must be actual, of controlling force,
and in respect to traffic important in amount, in order to
avoid the 4th Section.
There sometimes arise cases where the rail

and wat-

er competition between shorter distances is of greater force
than between the longer.

In this case the Commission holds

tine railroad not Justified in

charging lower rates to the

longer than to the shorter hauls.
Not alone must there be competition between rail
and water, but it must be of some controllinl- force.

The

article must be one which thne railroad ":,ould naturally carry
and the competition must be real.

There mit't

ity of circumstances with one road,
with another.

be dissimilar-

which would not occur

Circutmstances and conditions that may be con-

sidered in estimating the dissimilarity created by water competition are:the traffic,

the character of the roads,

the character of

large number of empty cars moving in

the direc-

tion in which the traffic must be taken, and legitimacy of
the competition by the rail carrier.
In

cases where a lower

an abandonment

of the business,

above costs of management,
patrons,

d

?_-i

rate must be made or cause
whIch
'i.c
affords

some profit

or's no injustice to other

this would be legitimate competition; but where

the

low rate causes

the running of the road at a loss,

and im-

poses a burden uwon similar traffic at other points in such a
case, trie competition would be deemed destructive and illegit imate.
We find many marked instances of xater competition
in

thIis country,

but per-q.ps no better example can be found

than that between New York City and Boston.

Betvween these

two cities there is an iimense amount of traffic daily, and
it would be

.,ost unjust if the rail -aas not allowed to fix

prices so as to compete with the water.

The Commission

grants this case as one showing circumstances dissimilar and
tience allow the railroads to lower their rates so as to compete with the boats.
ville,

Just out of Boston is the town of Read-

being situated eight .niles inland,

competition does not reach.
compel the railroad to reduce

where the water

Suit was brought by this town to
their rates to the Boston rates,

but the Commission held that to thei

town the competition

did not flow and the rates need not be changed.
When circumstances arise under the 4th Section
which are such as the Commission would decide dissimilar,
there

i-ay be lesser rates to longer than to shorter distances,

but in no case must there be prejudice or advantage shown to
one person, company, firm or corporation, over another.
In some cases the conditions and differences in the
advantages of one road over another may be artificial and unnatural, in which case there is a continued reduction of rates
and

this is

not undesirable; but where the advantages are

natural and real which one region has and enjoys over anotler,
such contiriuir1g disturbances of rates should not be inaugcrated,

especially when thle charges are connodity rates,

shown to be unreasonable

not

in themselves.

Another good exauple of water competition in

this

country is shown in the traffic carried on between the cities
on the Pacific and those in our eastern states.

The Com-

mission holds that as to such articles as would be carried by
water unless the railroads were allowed to fix their rates so
as to compete with the boats,- as to such, the 4th Section
might be avoided; but as to that class which would still seek
the rail, rather than the water transportation, even though
the rail rates remained unchanged,- as to such, the rates
must remain fixed, and any violation of this rule is unjust
discrimination against the intermediate towns compelled to
pay the higher class rate on the same article.
Another case came before the Commission, the complaint alleging that higher rates were charged from New York
to Chattanooga than to Memphis and Nashville, which are on
the same line and in the same direction and being at a greater distance.

There was found to be water competition of con-

trolling force in case of Memphis, and so they were justified
in asking lower rates to

their city, but as to Nashville, no

competition exists and any greater charge for transportation
to Chattanooga than to Nashville would be in violation of the
4th Section of this Act.
Numerous cases of water competition might be cited,

12
but they are all

so similar in

nature that it

seems of little

'Je find water traf-Cic of great importance

necessity.

in

this

country, which comes naturally from the resources found here.
Much trade is carried on on the great lakes and rivers, which
causes numerous cases of competition with the railroads, and
makes this question a most important one.
Other than in

competition with carriers by water,

the circumstances allowing less to be charged for longer ti-an
for shorter distances, is where competition is with foreign
railroads or roads not subject to the provisions of this statute, also in rare cases of competition between roads subject
to the statute, when str-ct application of the general rule
of the statute would destroy rightful competition.
Competition in these cases, as in water competition,
must be real and actual, not a possibility of competItIon.
h-ere the same carrier operates two parallel lines, the low
charges on one road should not be made up by high rates on
the other.

This would result in much damage to the corLnmunity

of the second road, and would finally result in loss to the
road, for a railroad is greatly regulated in its success by
the prosperity of the surrounding conmunity.

A carrier shall

not establish rates on the different branches of its road, so
as to draw trade to one particular locality, which would naturally run elsewhere.

Such preference is not excused on the

grounds of competition.
I have said that in case of competition with a
foreign road, rates might be regulated accordingly, but this
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is

not so in

every case as the foreign road oft-t'mes agrees

with the rates of the United States roads.

This is so in the

run from San Francisco to Denver and to Kansas City.

Until

recently Canadian competition compelled a lower rate from San
Francisco to Kansas City than to Denver, but now that the foreign road has .adopted our rate, competition is no longer in
force.
Perhaps on this question of competition with foreign roads, no better and simpler case could be cited than
one occuring at the time of the World's Fair.

The Rome,

Watertown & Ogdensburg R. R. had a rate to Chicago and return
of %36.00.

After the opening of the Fair the Canadian roads

established a rate from the above places to Chicago and return of ?24.00.

The Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg road then

made a rate of $25.75.

The large traffic of foreigners to

the Fair necessitated the use of all roads to Chicago to insure safety and convenience of visitors.
Commission the Rome,

On applying to the

7,atertown & Ogdensburg road was relieved

from the operation of the 4th Section of the Act, during the
continuance of the Fair.

If this had not been granted it

would have been a great injustice to the road and an injury
to the United States, for if our rates were compelled to remain fixed,

most of the World's Fair traffic

from tbe East

would have been over the Canadian roads.
If in the creation of competition the circumstances
and conditions have been established by the carrier himself,
or are such as might have been avoided by a reasonable exer-
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tion and effort on his part, then in these cases, even though
the circumstances and conditions are not of his creation and
could not be obviated by reasonable effort on his part, in
this case he is justified in regulating his rates to prevent
a loss to the road.
Rates can never be arbitrarily charged by the carrier.

They must be adjusted with regard to the

the public as well as the carrier.

4nterests

of

Rates should always be

comparatively reasonable; that is where competition exists,
and where it does not there should be some reasonableness in
the comparative charges.

Such a competitive rate should nev-

er be charged as to make the carrier run its road at a loss,
and on the other hand a rate high beyond all reason should
never be charged.

The more even the rates for the longer and

shorter distances, the better satisfied will be the community,
and I think I am safe in
the road.

saying,- the more prosperous will be

If lower rates are charged for a longer than for a

shorter haul, and a complaint follows, the carrier will probably aver substantial dissimilarity in circumstances and
conditions under the 4th Section, as justifying the greater
charge for the shorter distance, and he must show by his
pleading that the conditions are dissimilar, but upon an application for relief under the 4th Section proviso, the carrier

is

not limited by such a rule of evidence and may pre-

sent to the Commission every material reason for an order in
his favor.

C 0

C
T,

U S I 0 T

Were we to look at all the cases which arise under
"the long and short haul clause" we would undertake an endless task; suffice to say that we have viewed some of the
most important ones.

From the first much complaint arose

against the operation of this Section of the Act, and seemed
from the start to be increasing until this last year, when
signs of less dissatisfaction appeared.

Certain it seems

that the operation of this Section cannot fail to work good
upon the country.

Pates are now fairly proportional between

the local communities and the great centers.

The result

seems to be greater satisfaction to the local communities and
this is accomplished without affecting the great centers of
commerce, and it seems that the outcome cannot but be beneficial to the carriers themselves.

Nothing is more desirable

to a railroad, than that its patrons should believe its rates
to be just; in fact, the success of the road is largely due
to the sentiment of the people along its line.

Let the rates

remain different between the terminal points and local towns,
as have been cases in the past, and a feeling of dissatisfaction will arise all along the line.

The towns come to a

standstill, manufactories close; slowly but surely the town
once brisk in trade fades away.

Can a railroad remain pros-

perous with this happening all along its line, or is the
prosperous road the one running through the busy and hustling

community?

This question answers itself.
During the last year most of the complaint has come

from the NTew England States, with special reference to the
City of Boston.

The idea that this section effects the int-

erests of Boston differently from Tew York or any other commercial center, seems unfounded and the fact that no complaint is heard from the railroads about Poston seems almost
conclusive proof that the industries are not effected, for as
stated above, the prosperity of the community is sure to regulate the profits of the road.
Previous to the passage of the Tnterstate Commerce
Act, and between the years 1850 and 1885, seventeen of the
States of the Union had by statute made illegal the charging
of a higher rate for a shorter than for a longer distance.
Some of the provisions were broad and general, while others
were narrow and failed to cover all cases.

Vrhen this Act was

passed in 1887 by Congress, several States,

(including Tiss-

ouri, Minnesota and NTebraska), passed statutes in general
harmony with the Federal laws, and others have since done tle
same.
From the fact that one half of the States of the
Union, by enactments covering almost half a century, have declared the principles of the long and short haul clause to
be just, and for the public interest; from the fact that the
enactments have remained in force, and that no cry has been
heard from either the people or the railroads;

is it not

reasonable to think that the result of the 4th Section of the
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Interstate Commerce Act will be the general promotion of the
welfare of this dountry?
At the time the Act went into force there were numerous cases where less was charged for the longer haul than
for the shorter, and so it was cautiously, and with regard to
the existing state of things, that this law was to be put
into force.
Exceptions were in some cases made to the law, and
the Commission always acted as it deemed wise.

The then ex-

isting differences in rates have been slowly abolished and I
cannot doubt that if the carriers by rail shall accept this
principle as being clearly right and just, and proceed to
eliminate those cases where greater charges are paid for a
shorter distance, for the same goods over the same line, and
in

the same direction, than for a like longer distance,

that

it will not only be of benefit to the public, but also to
the railroads themselves.

I

